Rajasthan HC: Authenticated bank return memo can be marked later in cheque bounce case; mere exhibition does not prove document

The

Rajasthan High Court has held that a bank return memo initially exhibited without the bank's seal or authorised signature can subsequently be produced in authenticated form and marked as another exhibit, where the later document merely corrects an inadvertent evidentiary error rather than filling an inherent lacuna in the complainant's case.

Justice Sunil Beniwal, dealing with a petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, further clarified that mere marking of a document as an exhibit does not amount to its proof or admission.

The Court dismissed a petition challenging the trial court's decision to mark the subsequently produced bank return memo as Exhibit-9 in a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Cheque of Rs 3.90 lakh dishonoured for insufficient fundsThe case arose from a complaint filed by Gopal Traders against Gulam Mohd. under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The complainant alleged that the petitioner had borrowed Rs 3,90,000 and issued a cheque towards repayment. When the cheque was presented, it was dishonoured for âInsufficient Fundsâ through a bank return memo dated 06.04.2018.

A statutory demand notice was thereafter issued, and the complaint was instituted following non-payment of the cheque amount.

First return memo exhibited without bank authentication

During the trial, the complainant was examined and produced an online-generated bank return memo on 04.03.2020. The document was marked as Exhibit-2. The petitioner subsequently pointed out during cross-examination that the return memo did not bear the seal of the bank or the signature of an authorised bank official.

The complainant thereafter produced another return memo relating to the same transaction, this time bearing the bank's seal and the signature of an authorised signatory. The trial court permitted it to be marked as Exhibit-9 on 09.02.2026.

The petitioner objected, arguing that the document relating to the same transaction had already been exhibited as Exhibit-2 and that the subsequent production was an attempt to cure a defect that had emerged during cross-examination.

The Sessions Court rejected the challenge, following which the petitioner approached the High Court.

Petitioner argued complainant was trying to fill a lacunaBefore the High Court, the petitioner argued that the complainant could not introduce another return memo after the earlier document had already been exhibited. It was submitted that the subsequent memo was produced only after the defence had exposed the absence of the bank's seal and signature on Exhibit-2.

The petitioner also argued that no formal application had been filed seeking to bring the document on record and that simply producing it with a âTalbanaâ and getting it marked as an exhibit could not cure the defect.

The complainant's side, however, contended that no prejudice would be caused because the trial was still at the stage of complainant's evidence and the petitioner would have a full opportunity to cross-examine the complainant regarding the subsequent document.

Supreme Court's distinction between lacuna and inadvertent errorThe High Court rejected the argument that the subsequent return memo necessarily amounted to filling a lacuna.

Justice Sunil Beniwal referred to the Supreme Court's decision in

Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Cell through its Officer in Charge, Delhi, (1999) 6 SCC 110, which distinguishes between an inherent weakness in a prosecution case and an oversight or mistake occurring during the conduct of a trial.

The Supreme Court had explained that a âlacunaâ refers to an inherent weakness or latent defect in the prosecution case, whereas an inadvertent mistake in producing relevant material does not necessarily constitute such a lacuna.

The Rajasthan High Court also referred to

P. Chhaganlal Daga v. M. Sanjay Shaw, (2003) 11 SCC 486, and

U.T. of Dadra & Nagar Haveli v. Fatehsinh Mohansinh Chauhan, (2006) 7 SCC 529, concerning the Court's power to permit additional material where necessary for a just decision.

Applying those principles, the High Court found that the present case was not one where the complainant had initially failed to produce an essential document and later attempted to introduce it without justification.

Instead, the bank return memo had already been produced at the initial stage. The defect was that the first version was a computer-generated slip without the bank's seal and authorised signature.

When its authenticity was questioned during cross-examination, the complainant produced the authenticated version.

The Court held:

âSuch production of document cannot be said to be an attempt to fill the lacuna, but only correction of an inadvertent error.âThus, the Court treated the subsequent production as correction of an evidentiary defect rather than introduction of an entirely new piece of evidence.

Marking document as exhibit does not mean it is provedThe High Court also made an important distinction between exhibiting a document and admitting or proving its contents. It noted that marking a document as an exhibit primarily serves the purpose of identification. Whether the document is ultimately admissible and what evidentiary value it carries must be determined in accordance with the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam.

The Court relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in

LIC of India v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen, (2010) 4 SCC 491, which held that mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof.

The High Court further referred to the Supreme Court's recent decision in

S. Sangeetha v. Tmt. P. Ponni, 2026 INSC 813, reiterating that documents marked during evidence still must be proved in accordance with law. The Court therefore clarified that the marking of Exhibit-9 did not automatically establish its authenticity, execution or contents.

Accused entitled to challenge genuineness during cross-examinationThe High Court found that the petitioner would have a full opportunity to cross-examine the complainant regarding the subsequent return memo.

The Court directed the trial court to permit such cross-examination, if not already permitted, and allowed the petitioner to raise all objections concerning the admissibility of the document in accordance with law.

Consequently, the Court found no substantial prejudice to the petitioner merely because the document had been marked as Exhibit-9.

The Court also rejected the argument that the absence of a formal application under Section 311 CrPC, by itself, invalidated the marking of the document.

Relying upon the Constitution Bench judgment in

Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 116, the Court reiterated that procedural laws are intended to advance the ends of justice and that an inconsequential procedural error does not automatically vitiate a trial.

The relevant consideration is whether the procedural departure caused substantial prejudice or resulted in failure of justice.

In the present case, since the petitioner could test the authenticity and admissibility of the return memo through cross-examination, the Court found no such prejudice.

Holding that the subsequent marking of the authenticated bank return memo did not, in the circumstances, amount to impermissibly filling a lacuna, the High Court dismissed the criminal miscellaneous petition. The Court nevertheless expressly preserved the petitioner's right to challenge the genuineness and admissibility of Exhibit-9 before the trial court.

S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 4345/2026

Gulam Mohd. V Gopal Traders & Anr.

Date of Decision: 18.09.2026

Appearance:For Petitioner(s): Mr. R.C. Joshi. For Respondent(s): Mr. Vikram Singh Rajpuroit, PP Mr. Ravindra Singh Bhati, AGA(The author of this article, Vatsal Chandra is a Delhi-based Advocate practicing before the courts of Delhi NCR.)

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